March 13^th, 2004

Why Oldsmobile did not have to die

In the apparent absence of any willingness from the mainstream press to do so, we question the official line for the death of a brand that suffered from, then cured, Cimarronnesia

An iceberg? A desert? How apt - and these are, believe it or not, recent official Oldsmobile photos. The voice from within the brand, perhaps? The conscience of Ron Zarella? The longest-running American brand should not have ended thus. Soon, just a few burgundy Collector's Editions will be left; and then, the last Oldsmobile dealership will quietly cease selling new Oldsmobiles for the first time in a century. It is such an ignominious end for a brand once known for its innovation and performance, so unnecessary, and so unlamented in the mainstream press. Production ends this year. We will shed more than a tear, both for what was and what could have been. More importantly, however, Lutz and those like him must be permitted to ensure that this never happens again

Much though we like the Infiniti FX, we would have been still more impressed if...

...  the '99 Oldsmobile Recon Concept that preceded it by three years had been allowed to proceed. "The tall wagon," writes xyz in American Concept Cars (xyz, 2002), "featured advanced, but non-distinctive styling, no B-pillars, two sunroofs, and Smart Trac II all-wheel-drive. A 3-liter DOHC V-6, rated at 200 horsepower, motivated it. Flat panel displays, front and rear, provided both information and entertainment. Buttons in the center console and steering wheel controlled the functions. Space age design seats with no covering or padded space were said to be both comfortable and damage proof. The polyurethane floor covering was also claimed to be very durable." Even accounting for the mainstreaming that the concept would have undergone on its route to production, the Recon would have re-established the brand as a vanguard of innovation

Further evidence of the talent at Oldsmobile: the 2000 Profile Concept, described by designer Phil Zak (pictured) as "a logical step for drivers looking for an innovative, refined, and sophisticated that can meet their personal and family lifestyle." The Profile Concept featured seating for five, a Smart Card keyless entry system à la Mercedes, BMW, and current-day Renault, and conventionally-opening front doors mated to sliding rear doors

Oldsmobile's swansong: the 04 Concept of 2001, which - at some auto shows - was not even displayed with the rest of the Oldsmobiles. The fateful statement of December 12th, 2000, had been given. Predating the Solstice by a year, the 04 Concept may have been front-wheel-drive but was operational, based on an Opel Astra chassis and built by Bertone. With a line-up consisting of just the above three vehicles, Oldsmobile might have been able to command a premium for both its obvious and its under-the-skin innovation and sophistication, even as Buick remained conservative and Cadillac went for post-modernism. Besides, what better GM brand to welcome up-market Saturn customers (at least, back when Saturn stood for being different)?

Half the weight of the contemporary, C5 Chevrolet Corvette, and yet twice as rigid, the Aurora-powered Shelby Series 1 could have given Oldsmobile a Viper-like boost. Yet it is obvious from Eric Davison's well-written insider account that true cooperation from Oldsmobile was dependent on a few enthusiasts who lacked the power to move through a bureaucracy that, in hindsight, seemed determined on starving the division into suicide

Dumbing-down the 'halo' car - not only did Oldsmobile fail to see the value in the innovative Profile and Recon Concepts, and ignore the value of a 'halo' Shelby, but then proceeded to tame the Aurora's styling in 2001. What had been a futuristic, intriguingly convex/ concave shape with clean, simple-yet-effective details now became a blandly-reworked Pontiac Bonneville

1901 Oldsmobile 'Curved Dash' 1940 Oldsmobile w/ Hydramatic 1976 Oldsmobile Cutlass S - but one example of one of the best-selling nameplates ever offered to the U.S. market

If you love the Infiniti FX, as we do, brace yourself: it had a precedent, as our Senior Analyst Cord Bryson Raible has been ranting about to all who would listen for some time (Bryson, I owe you lunch - Ed).

In fact, that forerunner - and, more importantly, the thinking behind it - could have saved the longest-running brand in American history, one which once had an unquestioned reputation for innovation and performance.

Moreover, a new, revealing book by Eric Davison - Snake Bit (Motorbooks, 2004) - tells the story of how differently the Oldsmobile-powered Shelby American Series 1 (which could and should have done for Oldsmobile what the Viper did for Dodge) worked out, if the enthusiasts at Olds had been allowed to prevail.

The rather resigned attitude of the mainstream automotive media to Oldsmobile's fate greatly puzzles us.

• Not every domestic automotive company has had the luxury of being approached by an all-American, Goodyear-touting, national legend by the name of Carroll Shelby.
   

• Not since the original, 1986 Taurus had there been an American sedan with the eye-catching styling of the 1994 Aurora.
   

• Not every domestic automotive company has had Oldsmobile's nameplate and model brand recognition, nor has briefly allowed its hidden, innovative talent to shine before summarily dismissing and reassigning it.

Perhaps we should start with the part that has been as widely reported as GM, anxious to convince a final few holdout dealers to drop their lawsuits, and holdout customers to switch to another GM brand, has been able to engender.

The final Oldsmobile Alero and Silouhette - one car representative of the effort some made to rescue the brand, the other a cynically-rebadged reminder of why it dies this year - will soon roll off the production line, thus ending, rather ignominiously, America's oldest existing automotive nameplate.

When Ransom Eli Olds started the Olds Motor Vehicle Co. in Lansing, Michigan in 1897, he could hardly have seen it coming. Nor could later owner General Motors, as recently as 1985, when Oldsmobile moved 1,168,982 vehicles (its high point).

Indeed, in 1977, Oldsmobile became the first GM division after Chevrolet to sell more than one million cars.

Forgive us, then, if we do not toe the official line that Oldsmobile as a brand had become irretrievable, despite all attempts to revive it.

Misdirected resources

Hypothetically, if the General had put half as much effort into Oldsmobile as has been placed in GMDAT (the new mnemonic for defunct Daewoo), and cloning various results of GMDAT as Chevrolets, Suzukis, and Canadian Pontiacs (to say nothing of its on-again, off-again obsession with Fiat Auto and throwing Trailblazer platforms around), we might be telling a very different story.

If Volkswagen's current troubles, preceded by DaimlerChrysler's woes (and strongly countered by BMW's success and receipt of investor confidence after divesting itself of Rover - see Feature: The BMW-Rover story) have taught us anything, it is that buying brands to clone them for short-term profit while ignoring one's own treasures (step up Ford, for ignoring Lincoln in favor of current darlings Volvo and Jaguar) is a path wrought with mines.

Had GM been serious about investing in Oldsmobile for the long-haul, it might have noticed what some of the more perceptive members of the public saw (despite a gradual decline in promotion): the talent, certainly, was there.

In 1997, the Intrigue beat the Camcord in a Car and Driver test that should have signaled the beginning of a resurgence. While $6 billion has been spent to save Cadillac, however, Oldsmobile could only muster a short-lived - if somewhat fitting - product placement in the X-Files movie that summer.

Additionally, 1999 saw the introduction of the truly innovative Recon Concept, whose sophisticated styling would still work today amongst a growing sea of car-inspired SUV shapes.

The 2000 Profile Concept one year later predated the Chrysler Pacifica, adding sliding doors but avoiding the 'minivan look.'

Shown a month after the December 12^th official statement of execution, and often not to be found on the Oldsmobile stand at auto shows, the 04 Concept of 2001 preceded the Solstice and borrowed an existing platform from GM's Opel Astra.

Premature funeral

Not only was GM unwilling to spend the money required to rescue Oldsmobile, but it seemed intent on giving the brand a premature funeral.

Even the "soap, toasters, (and) brooms" (as described by Davison) marketing strategy of Ron Zarella should have been able to see that the combination of:

• ditching much-beloved model names (even after the mind-boggling atrocity of simply placing the 'Cutlass' label on the last-generation Chevrolet Malibu to create the latest and last Cutlass), and...
   

• ... putting the 'Oldsmobile' name only on the radio faceplates of the new Alero, Intrigue, and Aurora (all far better cars than anyone could possibly have expected), all the while...
   

• ... refusing to spend the money required to market the brand,

would effectively doom the resurgence effort to failure. Did Zarella not realize that the earliest Saturn buyers, favoring understatement with a touch of different, who were looking up-market for their next car had nowhere to go under GM's brand strategy? Or did the contemporary starvation of Saturn, as well as Oldsmobile, make their decline a convenient, self-fulfilling prophecy?

Unceremoniously pushing out enthusiasts such as Chevrolet General Manager Jim Perkins (credited with saving the Corvette) and Oldsmobile General Manager John Rock (an enthusiast of the Aurora-powered Shelby Series 1 project - see below) cemented the doomed strategy.

Put simply, GM buried Oldsmobile before deciding to kill it.

Resistance to the ultimate 'halo' project

Then, of course, there was the Oldsmobile-powered Shelby Series 1, a vehicle that could have cast a Dodge Viper-like glow over Olds. GM may have been want to avoid spending money on marketing Oldsmobile, but why give only cursory support to a project that garnered media goodwill and free publicity to the tune of several front page magazine features?

Why not call back the baby boomers who might have swung toward imports, but for whom the Shelby name was evocative of their youth?

In Snake Bit (Motorbooks, 2004), Eric Davison tells the story of Shelby's quest, beginning with the trials and tribulations of dealing with Oldsmobile General Manager John Rock without being constrained by marketing man Steve Shannon. It would be a common thread; only the names would change.

John Rock had been responsible for Oldsmobile's IRL Indy 500 series, which "Simply put," writes Davison, "he was the John Wayne of the car business, riding into Lansing, Michigan, in a white Oldsmobile to save the beleaguered car division from the sharp pencils of the GM accountants."

Rock was so adamant that Oldsmobile donate its Aurora V-8 to power the Series 1, that - faced with a reluctant John Gatt (Aurora program manager) - he virtually singlehandedly instituted a program for dealers to sponsor the Series 1's development. Sixteen dealers signed-up, at $50,000 apiece.

Unfortunately, Rock retired at the turn of 1997, even as he continued to assist with the project. That this type of enthusiasm was bureaucratically bottled borders on criminal.

Rock was succeeded by Darwin Clark, something of an enthusiast but not as inclined to find ways around bureaucracy as Rock had been. Davison cites Clark as being offended by Shelby's arrogance, but surely one could easily argue that far more important issues than personal sensibilities were at stake! Despite this, Clark apparently may have taken the option of placing the Oldsmobile badge on the Series 1 off the table.

Additionally, Davison notes that GM Powertrain was less than helpful, likely because it feared that the Series 1 might be competition for the Corvette; yet the Series 1 was twice as expensive, and decidedly more track-biased and hard-edged.

At the end of the day, there seems to be little reasoning for why Shelby American did not receive the support it deserved - or for why Oldsmobile never took advantage of the opportunity. To be fair, there were problems with the organization of Shelby American, as outlined in detail by Davison in Snake Bit.

What will Oldsmobile's legacy be, once the dust, and the negativity, settle? Paradoxically enough considering how much cynical rebadging was thrown at it, Olds was the first General Motors vehicle to reverse the disease we call Cimarronesia (after the notorious Cavalier-based Cadillac of the '80s). The 1994 Aurora, thanks to John Rock, featured a 4.0-liter version of Cadillac's excellent Northstar engine. Enthusiasts of the revival going on at Pontiac (article) - which has seen the division receive a rear-wheel-drive coupe before Cadillac, and a Cadillac Northstar-powered Bonneville GXP - would be proud.

Mind you, Oldsmobile never quite completed the Cimarronesia mission, as the blandly restyled second-generation Aurora was left to languish after having promised so much. The Northstar-based Olds flagship might have been a step in the right direction, but the cries of the division's engineers that 345hp - not the standard 240hp - were the true capabilities of its engine went unheeded by GM Powertrain (according to Davison). Pontiac will be left to carry the vanguard legacy - at least, in the maverick sense of the term - while Cadillac innovates and Buick tries to avoid following Olds to its grave.

In earlier days, Oldsmobile was a pioneer of chrome-plated trim (1926) and of automatic transmissions (1940), two staples of the domestic automobile psyche.

"It is credited," notes Davison, "with the first automotive assembly line, begun in 1901... (and) Oldsmobile advertising slogans were legendary."

Oldsmobile has brought us such memorable names as '4-4-2,' 'Toronado' (recently voted by Austraila's Wheels magazine as one of the most significant cars of all time), 'Eighty-Eight,' and 'Cutlass.' Some Oldsmobiles were more worthy than others, but enthusiasts and non-enthusiasts alike, when confronted with these labels, regularly display the kind of brand recognition that Infiniti, just a start-up in 1991, would have killed for.

Sadly, the type of ingenuity displayed by Infiniti's FX -  a key part of the Nissan luxury division's up-and-coming revival - was left at the concept stage. One wonders why Infiniti, and not Oldsmobile, is touting a midsize luxury car as "the intelligent muscle car" (M45).

Why must we read article after article about how Oldsmobile was beyond saving? "Certainly," notes Davison, "Rock didn't think so, and neither did (Oldsmobile engineers) Dennis Weglarz and Vic Ide.

"They were busy helping propel Oldsmobile to the World Sports Car championship as well as pushing them to the IMSA sedan championship. Those programs and the Shelby program required belief in Oldsmobile and its future as well as dedication and enthusiasm from GM."

It is a true pity that there is precious little evidence of any of the above being forthcoming from anyone not marginalized into submission - and mounting proof that the brand was squandered before people like Mr. Robert A. Lutz were in a position to do anything about it.

"Had Lutz been a force at GM when the Shelby project was getting underway, there is no doubt in my mind that the Series 1 project would have been viewed differently within GM," writes Davison.

We agree - and Mr. Lutz's mission is simple: GM will not lose another brand. That he has expressed recent support for even the short-lived Saturn makes our eyes water at what might have been done for Olds.

In the meantime, only the heartless will not shed a tear this August, as Oldsmobile needlessly falls by the wayside, a victim not of lacking a message but of wanton destruction in the name of short-term profit. It is a trend  many - including us - have cautioned about before, but rarely have its dire effects been quite so accelerated, tragic, or needless.